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Abstract: Some of the causes of the ‘sexual revolution’ during the past few
decades are widely known: The development of relatively safe and reliable
contraceptives, especially the birth-control pill; the ‘morning after’ pill;
antibiotics to relieve or cure sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea,
herpes, and syphilis; the increased social acceptance of pre-marital sex,
homosexuality, and other behaviors that formerly were considered deviant;
and the legalization of abortion as the ultimate ‘contraceptive’. But little
attention has been paid to two rather cerebral factors relevant to these
developments – namely, ethical theories, and theories of overpopulation. In
this paper I will argue that these two less well-known and more subtle factors
have been at least as powerful as the more obvious factors mentioned above,
in bringing about sea-changes in sexual mores. More specifically, I will argue
that some implicit approaches to ethical theory are more conducive than
others to bringing about the present status quo in sexual mores, and that the
widespread belief in world overpopulation has not only changed the moral
climate regarding sexuality, but has helped to redefine what is moral and
what is immoral.

I. Prevailing Moral Theories
It is a good question whether moral theories come before or
after actual human behavior. Although college classes in ethical theory
commonly feature analyses of Kant’s Categorical Imperative or Rawls’
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theory of justice, it is unlikely that those who have learnt these
theories, when facing a moral decision, would sit down and try to
determine whether their personal maxim can pass the
‘universalization’ test, or abstract from all their advantages and
interests and try to put themselves in a Rawlsian ‘original position’.
Possibly a few extremely cerebral professional moral theorists might
try to work out personal applications of their theories, when faced with
a moral decision. But it is much more likely that, for professionals and
‘everyman’, moral theories sum up the sorts of principles that people
already habitually follow, in making choices concerning right and
wrong.
If we wished to categorize these principles under the rubric of
prevailing moral theories, a likely candidate for the implicit ethical
commitment of denizens of modern industrial societies would be
utilitarianism. Of course, very few people, even professed utilitarians,
will reach for pencil and paper, to calculate positive and negative
Benthamite ‘units of happiness’; they will content themselves with
‘ballpark’ calculations. But many, going beyond ego-centered
questions of personal advantage, will engage in serious ‘considerations
of utility’ concerning the effect of their actions on the happiness of
others, and in their actions will try to avoid inflicting suffering on
others. In this sense, a utilitarian approach does seem to be the
‘method’ by which many people in cultures such as ours make their
moral decisions – and it is a procedure that jibes very well with
democracy and the ‘majority’ principle. Just as we expect democratic
leaders to work for the greater satisfaction of their constituents, so
also we tend to judge our own moral caliber, by examining the
beneficial or deleterious effects our actions have on those about us.
Thus, even though most people have never studied utilitarian theory, a
minimal, common-denominator utilitarianism may be their ‘rule of
thumb’, or main strategy, for moral decision-making.
As applied to sexuality, a utilitarian approach may emphasize
maximizing enjoyment for all parties while avoiding harm in sexual
encounters. The logical conclusion for those who think in this utilitarian
fashion, outside the parameters of traditional mores and religious
prohibitions, is the approval of anything between ‘consenting adults’ –
in other words, prohibition of rape, incest, pedophilia, and any kind of
sexual congress involving force or lack of consciousness, but
acceptance of anything else. Thus contraception, pre-marital
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cohabitation, and gay marriage are widely considered morally
acceptable from a utilitarian vantage point, as long as the resulting
benefits seem to outweigh any negative consequences. For those who
confine their purview of consequences to existing persons, abortion is
also acceptable, if it is considered conducive to the mental or physical
health, or psychological fulfillment, or social advancement, of the
mother; as well as conducive to a decrease in crime, decrease in
welfare entitlements, etc. At present, most utilitarians would want to
avoid harm to children and adolescents through sexual relationships
with adults, although some argue that consent is possible in such
cases. But consensual sex is a ‘slippery slope’: the prohibition of
pedophilia and ephebophilia is likely to be eventually relaxed, under
the rubric of extending experiences of pleasure even to consenting
children. This has already taken place in Holland, where twelve-yearolds are considered capable of engaging in consensual sexual
activities.
Another leading contender among prevailing but implicit moral
theories is the Golden Rule, ‘do unto others as you would have them
do unto you’, or, expressed negatively, ‘do not do to others what you
would not want them to do to you’. The positive version, attributed to
Jesus (Matthew 7:12, Luke 6:31), not only has Biblical sanction, but is
also akin to modern ‘universalization’ moral theories (e.g., ‘consider
whether you would want your personal moral maxim to be a universal
rule for everybody’), considered by proponents like Kant to be more
sophisticated and philosophically sound than the traditional Christian
formulation of the Golden Rule. But many ‘persons on the street’,
unacquainted with ethical theories, operate according to the Golden
Rule. Although they may not think about this as their principle for
moral action, it is applied tactically in their decision-making, and
transmitted by parents to their children in informal discussions of
values.
In sexuality, the Golden Rule emphasizes logical consistency in
your actions, and in what you expect from others. Contraceptive acts
might be considered to constitute an issue outside the parameters of
the Golden Rule, since contraception is portrayed as a private matter,
and is not, strictly speaking, ‘doing’ anything to anybody. The Golden
Rule can lead many to the condemnation of abortion, if they consider
the fetus a person, since most people could not consistently want to
have been aborted, themselves. Homosexuality is an ambiguous area.
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Homosexual activities may be considered consistent with the Golden
Rule, insofar as the homosexual might claim that he or she is doing to
another what they would want the other to do to them. On the other
hand, it might be considered a pattern of life responsible for perverting
the youth, undermining marriage, spreading disease, etc. – not the
sort of ‘right’ that you would want to be given to yourself and also,
consistently, to others. And if one defines sex in terms of the malefemale relationship, homo-sexuality would turn out to be a misnomer.
Less ambiguous in regard to sexual matters, and also
possessing Biblical credentials, is the concept of a natural law. St. Paul
adumbrates this idea in Romans 2:14–15, where he discusses God’s
judgment of the Gentiles, who were not subject to the Jewish law:
When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the
things contained in the law, they, having not the law, are a law
unto themselves. They show the work of the law written in their
hearts, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts
accusing or else excusing one another on the day when God
judges what is hidden in men.
Paul hailed from Tarsus, which was a hotbed of Stoic
philosophy, a major ancient source of natural-law thinking. It is quite
possible that Paul was familiar with the Stoic theories, although there
is nothing but circumstantial evidence for such intellectual influence.
The specific applications of the ‘law of nature’ that Paul cites in
Romans 2:21–22 are primarily the mandates included in the
Decalogue – against stealing, adultery, etc. Paul’s implication is that
such laws, rooted in human nature, were indeed given more explicit
expression in Moses’ time, but were by no means the exclusive
heritage of the Jews.
In philosophical circles, the idea of a natural law in morals was
further developed by later Stoic philosophers, incorporated into Roman
legal thinking by classical jurists such as Ulpian and Gaius, and
subjected to further refinement by medieval scholastics, especially St.
Thomas Aquinas, who fortified natural-law theory with Aristotelian
metaphysics and psychology. In the late medieval era, Renaissance
and Enlightenment, both Catholic and Protestant ethicists refined and
perpetuated natural law theory, before it was overshadowed by
utilitarianism, Kantian universalism, and other theories in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1
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But two twentieth-century developments have given an impetus
to the revival of natural-law thinking: The first was the Nuremberg
trials at the end of World War II, which raised the question: is there
some superior law that can be used as the criterion justifying the
court’s judgment of Nazi officers, who were arguably following valid
laws of the land? The second development was Pope Paul VI’s 1968
encyclical letter on birth control, Humanae vitae, which invoked
natural law as well as religious incentives against the use of artificial
contraceptive devices to avoid pregnancy. The Pope’s position was
criticized by many ethicists and has been the catalyst for a crisis of
authority in the Church. However, many natural-law theorists came to
the defense of the Pope, and their writings have led to a further
exploration both of the theoretical foundations of natural law, and of
the applications which it may have in law and in morals.
Opposition to natural-law theory in the twentieth century has
been largely fueled by dogmatic adherence among analytic ethicists to
David Hume’s famous interdiction about ‘deriving an ‘‘ought’’ from an
‘‘is’’; other analytic commitments include a sacrosanct observance of
the ‘fact-value’ distinction, and resolute avoidance of the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’. Natural-law theory, since it purports to find certain ethical
norms rooted in human nature itself, seems to break these established
rules. I and other writers have argued that natural law, as traditionally
understood, is not indeed guilty of an infraction of any of these
metaethical rules.2 However, largely as a result of such criticisms, in
the last few decades the natural-law tradition has split into two
‘camps’ – the ‘new natural law’ theorists, which claim to support a
version of natural law which obviates Humean objections, and the
traditional natural-law theorists.3 These two camps are in
disagreement about metaphysical or anthropological presuppositions
(whether there can be a grounding in human nature itself for moral
norms), but maintain a large bedrock of agreement on many practical
issues. In sexuality, a pivotal principle concerns the necessary
connection of sexuality with reproduction, and/or the avoidance of
‘contra-life’ sexual practices. Contraception is opposed, as bringing
about an absolute artificial separation of sexuality from the production
of new life – a separation which can lead by a ‘slippery slope’ to the
legitimation of ‘recreational sex’ of all types, including fornication and
homosexual activities. Various types of Natural Family Planning (NFP)
are, however, considered by most natural-law theorists to be morally
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acceptable: e.g., the Billings Ovulation Method, the Sympto-Thermal
Method, and the Standard Days Methods. With these methods, the
knowledge of ovulation states can be used either to promote or to
delay fertility, and does not necessarily involve any direct contra-life
intention.
Objections to the Pope’s invocation of natural law in Humanae
vitae often cite the alleged unreasonableness of requiring that every
single act of sexual intercourse be oriented toward reproduction. This
interpretation is a mistake. Like many directives of natural law, the
obligations with regard to sexual intercourse are not spelled out as
multiple positive duties; only certain negative boundaries are pointed
out. Some examples from other precepts of the natural law can help to
clarify the importance of these ‘negatives’: For instance, the duty of
telling the truth does not imply that we have to give everyone the
positive information that they may request from us, but only that we
do not tell them falsehoods; the duty of self-preservation does not
entail that we must take all available vitamins, ‘work-out’ regularly,
receive optional surgical procedures, etc., but only that we do nothing
that would be seriously contrary to preserving oneself – suicide being
the most extreme example; the duty of advancing in knowledge of
God does not require us to engage in theological investigations, but
only to avoid an ideological mind-set which shuts out any possibility of
such knowledge; and the duty of advancing rational social structures
does not mean we must perform this or that specific and highly
esteemed action for community betterment, but only that we avoid
anything that will contribute to serious social disintegration. Like the
daimon of Socrates, which he describes in Plato’s Apology as
counseling only what Socrates should not do, but not what he should
do, natural-law directives, like the last seven commandments of the
decalogue, focus on some ultimate ‘thou shalt nots’, setting certain
parameters beyond which morality would ipso facto be abandoned. In
the case of a natural-law approach to sexuality, the limiting
parameters have to do with types of sexual intercourse intended to
make reproduction impossible. In Natural Family Planning, merely
refraining from intercourse during presumed fertile periods is not a
transgression of those parameters. In using abortifacient
contraceptives such as IUDs, Norplant and Depo-Provera, not only is
the contra-life intention clear; but the two issues of abortion and
contraception begin to converge – as also with the use of
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contraceptive pills, which sometimes work after fertilization to prevent
implantation of the fertilized egg. Even those who view contraception
as morally permissible, but are opposed to abortion, sometimes have
objections to the use aborifacient contraceptives.
Some Christian ethicists make a sharp distinction between
sexual intercourse as reproductive, and, on the other hand, as
contributing to love and communion among spouses. They say that
since these aims are equally important in marriage, a couple might
cultivate just the latter aim, especially if the former aim is perceived
as an obstacle to marital communion. But this is an artificial and stark
separation of the aims of individuals from the aims of nature – like
separating eating as enjoyment of the fruits of nature from its
contribution to health – after the pattern of the ancient Roman
vomitoria, which allowed participants in banquets to eat for hours and
hours without stop, or (to cite a more contemporary phenomenon) the
eating disorder, bulimia. (As in the examples cited above, the
‘negatives’ are important here; no one is saying that every act of
eating has to be positively directed towards conservation of health, but
only that an act which clearly scorned the purpose of eating in the
pursuit of pleasure is unnatural and immoral.) Everyone knows that
love or affection are very often not connected with sexual intercourse,
and in fact indifference or hate are often the unfortunate concomitants
of the act; but for nature itself, even construed in the context of
Darwinian ‘natural selection’, the ‘intent’ of reproduction is always a
concomitant of the sex act. A natural-law approach leads us to join our
purposes with the implied purposes of nature as far as possible.

II. The Overpopulation Myth
The widespread diffident attitude toward natural law (due in
large part to a misunderstanding of the meaning of natural law) is not
the only, or even the most important, catalyst for altering the moral
landscape of sexuality. An even more serious challenge to traditional
standards of sexual morality is the widespread belief, often a tenet of
scientific ‘faith’, that the world is overpopulated, and that we must do
everything possible, individually and socially, to curb the number of
offspring. This belief is often described as ‘neo-Malthusianism’,
referring to the now-discredited eighteenth-century theory propounded
by Thomas Malthus. Malthus theorized that, while the world’s foodsupply increased in arithmetical proportion, the world’s population
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increased in geometrical proportion. This exponential growth of
population, according to Malthus, would inevitably bring about the
depletion of the world’s resources and concomitant famine, disease,
poverty, etc.
Early in the twentieth century, eugenicists formed the first flank
in the battle against overpopulation. Margaret Sanger, citing the
inspiration of Malthus and John Stuart Mill,4 opted for the elimination
of ‘defectives’ in world populations by the use of contraceptives, and
supported the efforts of the ‘Malthusian League’ to incorporate
population reduction into the agenda of the League of Nations.5 In
recent decades, and in an even more hysterical fashion, the NeoMalthusian, Paul Ehrlich, has been warning about catastrophic results
of overpopulation. Ehrlich in his best-selling book of the sixties, The
Population Bomb,6 predicted that by the end of the twentieth century
hundreds of millions would die of starvation, India would collapse,
England would disappear, etc. Ehrlich’s message, like Malthus’
message, was that the world’s population is rapidly outstripping the
food supply of the planet, as if the food supply were something
progressing in regular arithmetical intervals. But in fact the world’s
food supply has steadily increased in something like ‘geometrical’
proportion; and with the help of agricultural technology and human
ingenuity, food supplies can continue to increase in tandem with
population.7
Nevertheless, motivated only by ideology, and in spite of the
fact that many European countries have arrived at such low birth
levels that their continued existence is threatened, activists for
contraception and abortion still invoke a ‘population explosion’. And
the perception that there is just too little space for the people of the
world persists – in spite of the fact that for the present 6.2 billion
people in the world, outside Antarctica, there is about 246,000 square
feet per person, and in spite of the fact that if the population of the
entire world were relocated just in Texas in the United States, each
person would have approximately 1300 square feet per person! The
‘space’ in such statistical projections would include, of course,
mountains and deserts, but also oases and valleys and fertile plains;
and ‘horizontal’ space can be supplemented with ‘vertical’ space –
multi-storey buildings, etc.
It is obvious that what is called the ‘overpopulation problem’ is
not a space problem, but more precisely a problem of distribution of
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wealth and resources – a political/social/ethical issue. Even if, through
massive worldwide sex education, the distribution of condoms,
sterilization, etc., the world’s population could be reduced by one-sixth
to around five billion, there is no guarantee that the percentage (or
even the numbers) of poor people would be reduced; the ratio of
impoverished to the well-fed could even grow to greater heights.
Worst-case scenarios may prevail. For example, even after such a
hypothetical reduction in population, parents with fewer children may
have less help in farming work, fewer contributors to the family
finances, and less assistance from family members in their old age;
employers, aware that families are smaller, may cut wages
proportionally; government officials, administering a decreasing
population, may curtail distribution of resources and/or raise taxes to
increase revenues; and so forth. Simple formulas for reducing the
number of children can have no predictable effect on such problems.
The effect of neo-Malthusianism on Christian ethics is little
noticed, but enormous. In spite of the failure of the predictions of
overpopulation gurus to come true, many now consider the Biblical
mandate, ‘increase and multiply’ (Genesis 1:28) to be outmoded –
possibly significant for our distant ancestors, but no longer applicable
even for those who adhere to Judaeo-Christian traditions. Put
differently, the common modern wisdom maintains that we have
fulfilled this command. The argument goes: God should certainly be
satisfied with our numbers now; and – although God hasn’t revealed
His will about this in any explicit way – presumably He wills us to
follow what is generally held to be the ‘best’ science today. Needless to
say, the moral fallout of the overpopulation myth has been
considerable. By many committed to overpopulation dogma, it is now
considered to be a virtue to do anything possible to avoid
reproduction.
The combination of the rejection of the natural law regarding
contraception and a pseudo-scientific and quasi-religious commitment
to reducing the world’s population, combined with the other cultural
and technological developments mentioned at the outset of this paper,
leads not illogically to wide-ranging changes in sexual morality. If
contraception is legitimate for married couples, why not also for any
‘consenting adults’ – granted that the latter are motivated by love as
much as, or even more than, married couples? And why draw a line for
‘consent’ at some artificial measure of ‘legal adulthood’, like eighteen
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years of age? Likewise, homosexuality and masturbation, which by
definition eschew reproduction, can easily be construed as advancing
social objectives such as ‘zero population growth’. Even pornographers
might consider themselves moral standard-bearers for promoting the
pursuit of innocuous personal pleasure rather than selfish and
inconsiderate family breeding. Abortion, for a liberal Christian,
extremely distraught about uncontrollable population growth and
dedicated to the affirmation of women’s rights, might be considered
the ‘lesser of two evils’ – the ‘other evil’ being inconsiderate additions
to the world’s population.
The synergetic effect of the combination of the contraceptive
mentality with overpopulation hysteria may be lessened if we begin to
grapple with the real overpopulation issue – recognizing the realities
underlying this issue, recognizing the injustices and inequities
prevailing in domains such as politics, economics, and business. The
fact that, for example, the United States, with 5% of the world’s
population, is consuming 30% of the world’s resources, cannot be
ignored. Our growing awareness of this imbalance should inspire both
individual and communal efforts to right the wrongs, and reduce the
gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. But – ‘overpopulation’
being understood as the excessive numbers of impoverished people –
simplistic solutions like global promotion of contraception and abortion
will do nothing to alleviate global injustices; and married couples will
do nothing to sustain the planet, and make no advances in personal or
civic virtue, by intentionally avoiding offspring.
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